Introduction
On 16 July 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee, delivered its judgment in the case of Pouros v. Greece (Application no. 74259/17, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0716JUD007425917). The case concerned a Greek national, Mr Athanasios Pouros, who had been convicted by Greek criminal courts of negligent homicide following a road traffic accident in August 2010. The application was lodged with the Court on 12 October 2017.
The judgment addresses two interrelated fair trial guarantees under Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: the general right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1, and the specific right of an accused to examine or have examined witnesses on his behalf under Article 6 § 3(d). The case raises important questions about the obligations of domestic courts to provide adequate reasons when they decline to order expert evidence or to hear witnesses proposed by the defence.
Background and factual context
The events giving rise to the application occurred on 7 August 2010, when the applicant was driving under the influence of alcohol and lost control of his vehicle, which struck a pedestrian, I.G., who was walking on the side of the road. The applicant transported the victim to the Kapandriti Health Centre. Given the seriousness of his condition, the victim was subsequently transferred to the 'Korgialeneio Benakeio' General Hospital, where he was intubated and admitted to the intensive care unit. He remained there until his death on 4 October 2010.
The applicant was charged with negligent homicide. On 3 December 2013, the three-member Athens Criminal Court for misdemeanours delivered judgment no. 62812/2013, finding the applicant guilty and imposing a two-and-a-half-year suspended prison sentence. In the course of those proceedings, the court dismissed the applicant's request for an expert report to determine the victim's cause of death, as well as his request to call two treating doctors as witnesses. The court reasoned that the victim's continuous stay in the intensive care unit was a direct consequence of the accident and that a hospital-acquired infection could not be regarded as a decisive factor in the death.
The applicant appealed. On 2 April 2015, before the evidentiary procedure commenced before the three-member Athens Criminal Court of Appeal for misdemeanours, the applicant renewed his request for an expert report. He argued that the victim had died from a hospital-acquired infection attributable to inadequate hygiene standards, and he identified specific questions the expert should address, together with relevant documents and evidence. He also renewed his request to hear two doctors who had treated the victim and who had, he alleged, signed contradictory documents concerning the victim's condition and the circumstances of his death. The appellate court dismissed the request for an expert report by an incidental decision, stating only that such a report 'was not required', and by judgment no. 1813/2015 again found the applicant guilty, reducing the sentence to a two-year suspended prison sentence.
The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation, arguing among other things that the appellate court had failed to provide adequate reasons for dismissing the expert report request and had given no reasons at all for rejecting the request to examine the doctors as witnesses. By judgment no. 837/2017 of 4 May 2017, the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal. It held that the appellate court had tacitly rejected the witness request as inadmissible on grounds of vagueness, because the applicant had not specified the facts on which the witnesses would testify, the expected outcome of their testimony, or the reason why their testimony was necessary. As regards the expert report, the Court of Cassation held that the reasoning in the appellate court's conviction judgment made it apparent why the report had been considered unnecessary, and that the request had been dismissed because the appellate court had already formed a view on criminal liability on the basis of existing evidence.
The complaints before the European Court of Human Rights
The applicant complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(d) of the Convention on two grounds. First, he contended that the domestic courts' judgments had not been adequately reasoned in so far as they dismissed his request for an expert report. Second, he argued that he had not been given an opportunity to examine witnesses of his choice, namely the two doctors who had treated the victim.
The Court declared the complaint concerning the reasoning of the domestic courts' dismissal of the expert report request admissible, noting that it was not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3(a) of the Convention and was not inadmissible on any other grounds.
Central to the applicant's position was the contention that the victim's cause of death had not been clear, and in particular that it was uncertain whether death had resulted from injuries sustained in the accident or from an extraordinary infection acquired during the hospital stay. This uncertainty, he argued, was directly relevant to the question of his criminal liability for negligent homicide and warranted independent expert examination.
Key legal issues under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(d)
The judgment engages with the well-established principle that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention requires domestic courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions. Where a court declines to order a measure of inquiry sought by the defence, such as an expert report, the reasoning provided must be adequate to allow the parties and any reviewing court to understand why the measure was considered unnecessary.
In the present case, the appellate court's incidental decision dismissing the expert report request contained only the bare statement that such a report 'was not required'. The Court of Cassation subsequently sought to supplement this by reference to the reasoning contained in the appellate court's conviction judgment, concluding that the appellate court had already formed an opinion on criminal liability from the existing evidence. The adequacy of this approach, and whether it satisfied the requirements of Article 6 § 1, formed a central issue before the Strasbourg Court.
Article 6 § 3(d) guarantees the right of an accused to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him. The domestic courts' handling of the applicant's request to call the two treating doctors raised questions about the procedural conditions imposed on defence witness requests and whether the standard applied — requiring the defence to specify the facts, expected outcome, and necessity of each witness — was compatible with this guarantee.
The Court of Cassation's characterisation of the witness request as tacitly rejected for vagueness, rather than explicitly addressed by the appellate court, also raised questions about the transparency and adequacy of the domestic procedural framework as applied in this case.
Procedural observations and the role of the Committee formation
The case was examined by the Third Section sitting as a Committee composed of three judges: President Peeter Roosma, Ioannis Ktistakis, and Lətif Hüseynov, with Olga Chernishova serving as Deputy Section Registrar. The Committee formation is typically used where cases raise issues that are already the subject of well-established case law of the Court, allowing for a more streamlined procedure.
The Government of Greece was represented by their Agent, Ms N. Marioli, and their Agent's delegate, Ms I. Kotsoni, Legal Representative at the State Legal Council. The applicant was represented by Mr D. Ninopoulos, a lawyer practising in Athens. The Court had regard to the parties' observations and deliberated in private on 23 June 2026 before delivering the judgment on 16 July 2026.
The judgment is stated to be final but subject to editorial revision, which is the standard position for judgments delivered by Committees under the Convention's procedural framework.
Significance for the duty to give reasons in criminal proceedings
The case illustrates the tension that can arise between the efficiency of domestic criminal proceedings and the Convention's requirements of procedural fairness. Where a domestic court dismisses a defence request for expert evidence with minimal reasoning, and a higher court subsequently attempts to reconstruct or infer that reasoning from the conviction judgment itself, questions arise as to whether the accused has received the transparent and reasoned decision-making that Article 6 § 1 demands.
The applicant's argument that the cause of death was genuinely uncertain — given the victim's prolonged stay in intensive care and the possibility of a hospital-acquired infection — was not a peripheral matter. It went directly to the causal link between the applicant's conduct and the victim's death, which is an essential element of the offence of negligent homicide. The refusal to obtain independent expert evidence on this point, without adequate explanation, is the core concern addressed by the Court.
The case also highlights the importance of procedural clarity when domestic courts reject defence requests on grounds of vagueness or insufficiency. Where such a rejection is not made explicit at the time of the hearing but is instead characterised retrospectively by a cassation court as a tacit decision, the accused may be left without a meaningful opportunity to understand or challenge the basis on which his request was refused.
Conclusion
The judgment in Pouros v. Greece addresses important aspects of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(d) of the Convention, in the specific context of a criminal conviction for negligent homicide where the defence sought, but was denied, expert evidence and witness examination relevant to the cause of the victim's death. The case underscores the obligation of domestic courts to provide adequate and transparent reasoning when declining to order measures of inquiry requested by the defence, and the limitations of retrospective reconstruction of that reasoning by higher courts.
Practitioners and institutions engaged with criminal procedure and human rights compliance in Council of Europe member states may find the Court's analysis instructive as to the standards expected when courts exercise their discretion to refuse defence evidence requests. The judgment is available on the HUDOC database at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-251187.
This article is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Sources consulted
- CASE OF POUROS v. GREECE - European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe
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