Introduction
On 16 July 2026 the Court of Justice of the European Union, sitting as the Grand Chamber, delivered its judgment in Case C-196/24 (xx v ww and Others), assigned the ECLI identifier ECLI:EU:C:2026:587. The case arose from a reference for a preliminary ruling submitted by the tribunal judiciaire de Chambéry (France) by decision of 16 January 2024, received at the Court on 20 February 2024.
The judgment addresses a question of considerable practical and constitutional sensitivity: whether, and on what conditions, a court in one EU Member State that has been asked to execute a cross-border evidence request may refuse to carry out an exhumation of a body ordered for the purpose of post-mortem genetic testing to establish parentage. The legal framework at the centre of the case is Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 on cooperation between the courts of Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters, and in particular Article 12(2) of that Regulation.
Because the Grand Chamber was convened to hear the case, the ruling carries particular institutional weight and is likely to serve as an authoritative reference point for national courts across the European Union when they encounter analogous cross-border evidence requests touching on fundamental rights.
The legal and factual background
The proceedings before the referring court concern a dispute styled xx v ww and Others, with the Ministère public (public prosecutor's office) participating as a joined party. The precise identities of the parties are anonymised in the published text, which is consistent with the Court's practice in sensitive family-law matters.
The core factual scenario involves a requesting court that had adopted a measure of inquiry requiring the exhumation of a body so that a DNA sample could be obtained and analysed for the purpose of establishing a parentage relationship. The requested court, situated in a different Member State, was asked to execute that measure. The question referred to the Court of Justice concerned whether the requested court could lawfully decline to do so on the ground that the taking of such evidence would be contrary to the fundamental principles of the law of the requested Member State.
The legal provision at issue, Article 12(2) of Regulation (EU) 2020/1783, governs the grounds on which a requested court may refuse to execute a request for the taking of evidence. One such ground relates to rules of substantive law of the requested Member State where the taking of the evidence is considered to be contrary to the fundamental principles of the law of that State. The judgment therefore required the Grand Chamber to interpret the scope and limits of that refusal ground in a context engaging both the right to respect for human dignity (Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) and the right to respect for private and family life, which the Court connected to the right to know one's genetic origins (Article 7 of the Charter).
The regulatory framework: Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 and Article 12(2)
Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 forms part of the EU's broader framework for judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters within the area of freedom, security and justice. It establishes a system under which a court in one Member State (the requesting court) may ask a court in another Member State (the requested court) to take evidence on its behalf, or may itself take evidence directly in another Member State.
Article 12(2) of the Regulation is the provision that the Grand Chamber was called upon to interpret. It sets out the circumstances in which a requested court may refuse to execute a request. Among the grounds listed is the situation where a rule of substantive law of the requested Member State renders the taking of the evidence contrary to the fundamental principles of the law of that State. This ground is an exception to the general obligation of cooperation and, as with all exceptions in EU law, is subject to strict interpretation.
The judgment thus required the Court to define what qualifies as a 'rule of substantive law' capable of triggering the refusal ground, and to determine how the fundamental principles of the requested Member State's law must be assessed in light of the overarching requirements of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The involvement of Articles 1 and 7 of the Charter signals that the Court approached the question not merely as a matter of procedural cooperation but as one engaging core constitutional values recognised at EU level.
The Charter dimensions: human dignity and the right to know one's genetic origins
The judgment explicitly engages Article 1 of the Charter, which enshrines the right to human dignity, and Article 7, which protects the right to respect for private and family life. The Court's treatment of these provisions in the context of post-mortem genetic testing reflects the dual tension inherent in such cases.
On one side stands the dignity of the deceased person, whose bodily remains are the subject of the proposed exhumation. The physical integrity of a body after death and the respect owed to the dead are values that many Member States protect through rules of substantive law, and the judgment acknowledges that such protections may legitimately engage the fundamental principles of a requested Member State's legal order.
On the other side stands the interest of a living person in knowing their genetic origins, an interest that the Court connects to Article 7 of the Charter. The right to know one's genetic origins has been recognised in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as an aspect of private life, and the Grand Chamber's engagement with Article 7 of the EU Charter in this context reflects the constitutional significance that EU law attaches to that interest. The judgment therefore required the Court to address how these competing values are to be weighed when a requested court considers whether to invoke the refusal ground under Article 12(2) of Regulation (EU) 2020/1783.
Scope of the refusal ground and the role of national fundamental principles
A central interpretive question addressed by the Grand Chamber concerns the proper scope of the phrase 'fundamental principles of the law of the requested Member State' as used in Article 12(2) of Regulation (EU) 2020/1783. The Court's approach to this phrase is significant because it determines how much latitude Member States retain to refuse cross-border evidence requests on grounds rooted in their own legal traditions.
The judgment makes clear that the refusal ground is an exception to the principle of mutual cooperation between courts of Member States, and that exceptions of this kind must be construed narrowly. A requested court cannot invoke the fundamental principles of its national law as a blanket justification for refusing any evidence request that differs from what its own procedural or substantive rules would permit in a purely domestic context. The threshold for refusal is higher than mere incompatibility with national law.
At the same time, the Court recognises that certain rules of substantive law protecting values such as human dignity may legitimately constitute fundamental principles within the meaning of Article 12(2). The key analytical task for the requested court is therefore to assess whether the specific rule invoked genuinely reflects a fundamental principle of its legal order, and whether applying that principle to refuse the request is proportionate in light of the competing rights and interests at stake, including the right to know one's genetic origins protected under Article 7 of the Charter.
The procedural context: reference from the tribunal judiciaire de Chambéry
The reference for a preliminary ruling was made by the tribunal judiciaire de Chambéry, a French court of first instance, by decision of 16 January 2024. The Court of Justice received the reference on 20 February 2024, and a hearing was held on 29 April 2025. The Grand Chamber delivered its judgment on 16 July 2026.
The participation of the Ministère public as a joined party is noteworthy. In French law, the public prosecutor's office has a role in certain civil proceedings, including those touching on matters of civil status and parentage. Its involvement underlines the public-interest dimension of the case, which extends beyond the private dispute between the named parties.
The case was assigned the internal reference Aucrinde, as indicated in the published text. The Grand Chamber composition included the President of the Court, K. Lenaerts, the Vice-President T. von Danwitz acting as Rapporteur, and a further thirteen judges, reflecting the constitutional importance attributed to the questions raised.
Implications for cross-border evidence requests in parentage proceedings
The judgment has direct practical implications for courts across the European Union that handle cross-border parentage proceedings in which genetic evidence is sought from the remains of a deceased person located in another Member State. Such situations are not uncommon in a Union characterised by significant cross-border mobility, and the absence of clear guidance on the limits of the Article 12(2) refusal ground had created legal uncertainty.
By clarifying the conditions under which a requested court may invoke the fundamental principles of its national law to refuse an exhumation request, the Grand Chamber provides a framework that national courts can apply in future cases. The judgment establishes that the requested court must conduct a genuine proportionality assessment, taking into account both the dignity-related interests associated with the deceased and the right of the living claimant to know their genetic origins as protected by Article 7 of the Charter.
The ruling also has implications for the broader operation of Regulation (EU) 2020/1783. It confirms that the Regulation's system of judicial cooperation is not unlimited and that Member States retain a constitutionally grounded space to protect fundamental values through the refusal ground in Article 12(2), while simultaneously ensuring that this space cannot be used to frustrate the effective exercise of rights recognised by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Conclusion
The Grand Chamber judgment of 16 July 2026 in Case C-196/24 represents a significant contribution to the EU law of cross-border judicial cooperation in civil matters. By interpreting Article 12(2) of Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 in the context of a request for post-mortem genetic testing through exhumation, the Court has clarified the relationship between the principle of mutual cooperation, the fundamental principles of national law, and the rights enshrined in Articles 1 and 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
The judgment confirms that the refusal ground available to a requested court is a genuine but narrowly construed exception, requiring a proportionality assessment that takes full account of the right to know one's genetic origins alongside the dignity interests of the deceased. National courts faced with similar requests under Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 will need to conduct that assessment carefully and with reference to the framework established by the Grand Chamber.
Persons involved in cross-border parentage proceedings or other civil matters requiring the taking of evidence in another Member State are encouraged to seek qualified legal advice from practitioners familiar with both EU procedural law and the relevant national law of the Member States concerned.
This article is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Sources consulted
Published by Synojus International
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