Introduction
On 1 October 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union, sitting as the Third Chamber, delivered its judgment in Case C-855/24 P, an appeal brought by Crown Holdings, Inc. and Crown Cork & Seal Deutschland Holdings GmbH against the European Commission. The case concerns a fundamental question in EU competition law: under what conditions may the European Commission initiate proceedings in a matter that a national competition authority is already investigating, and what procedural obligations apply when it does so?
The judgment engages with several overlapping legal frameworks, including Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities. Together, these instruments define the architecture of enforcement cooperation across the European Competition Network and set the boundaries of institutional discretion.
Legal and institutional background
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 is the principal instrument governing the enforcement of EU competition rules. Article 11(6) of that Regulation is directly at issue in this case. That provision addresses the situation in which the European Commission decides to initiate proceedings in a matter where a national competition authority is already acting, with the effect of relieving that national authority of its competence to apply EU competition law in the same case.
The case also arose in the context of a request made by the national competition authority itself for the Commission to relieve it of competence. This procedural posture raises specific questions about the scope of the Commission's discretion and whether that discretion is constrained when a national authority has actively sought the transfer of a case.
The Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities plays a significant role in the judgment. The Court examined whether, by adopting that Notice, the Commission had itself decided to limit its own discretion, and what legal consequences flow from such a self-imposed limitation, particularly in relation to the obligation to state reasons.
The principle of subsidiarity and Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
One of the central issues before the Court was whether the principle of subsidiarity constrains the Commission's power under Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 to initiate proceedings and thereby relieve a national competition authority of competence. The appellants argued that this principle imposes substantive limits on when the Commission may act in place of a national authority.
The judgment addresses the relationship between the Commission's enforcement powers and the broader principle of subsidiarity as it applies within the European Competition Network. The Court's analysis in this respect is significant for understanding how the allocation of cases between the Commission and national competition authorities is to be governed in practice.
The fact that the national competition authority had itself requested the Commission to take over the case adds a particular dimension to the subsidiarity analysis. The Court's treatment of this circumstance clarifies whether such a request affects the legal assessment of the Commission's decision to act under Article 11(6).
The right to good administration and the reasonable time requirement
The appellants also raised arguments grounded in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which enshrines the right to good administration. Among the specific guarantees contained in that provision is the requirement that institutions handle cases within a reasonable time.
The Court's judgment engages with the question of whether the Commission's conduct in this case satisfied the reasonable time requirement under Article 41 of the Charter. This aspect of the ruling is relevant to understanding the procedural standards that the Commission must observe when exercising its powers under Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, including in the context of case allocation decisions within the European Competition Network.
The principle of good administration, as reflected in Article 41 of the Charter, imposes obligations that go beyond mere procedural formality. The Court's analysis in this case contributes to the body of case law defining the practical content of those obligations in competition enforcement proceedings.
Self-limitation of discretion and the obligation to state reasons
A particularly notable aspect of the judgment concerns the legal effect of the Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities. The Court examined whether, by issuing that Notice, the Commission had itself decided to limit its discretion in relation to case allocation decisions, and whether this self-limitation gives rise to enforceable obligations.
Where an institution adopts a measure that limits its own discretion, questions arise as to the extent to which it is bound by that measure and what remedies are available to parties who rely on it. The judgment addresses these questions in the specific context of the Commission's powers under Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.
The obligation to state reasons is a general principle of EU law and a requirement under the Treaty framework. In this case, the Court considered whether the Commission had adequately fulfilled its obligation to state reasons for its decision to initiate proceedings, taking into account both the general legal requirements and any additional obligations arising from the Commission's own Notice. The interplay between self-imposed limitations and the duty to give reasons is a significant element of the Court's reasoning.
Significance for the European Competition Network
The judgment in Case C-855/24 P has broader implications for the functioning of the European Competition Network and the relationship between the Commission and national competition authorities. By clarifying the conditions under which the Commission may exercise its powers under Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the Court contributes to the legal certainty of the case allocation system.
The ruling also highlights the importance of procedural guarantees for undertakings that are subject to competition investigations. The application of Article 41 of the Charter and the obligation to state reasons ensure that the Commission's exercise of its enforcement powers remains subject to meaningful judicial review.
For national competition authorities, the judgment provides guidance on the legal framework governing requests to the Commission to relieve them of competence, and on the procedural consequences that may follow from such requests. This is relevant to the practical operation of cooperation mechanisms within the European Competition Network.
Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Justice of 1 October 2026 in Case C-855/24 P addresses important questions at the intersection of EU competition enforcement, institutional cooperation, and fundamental rights. By examining the scope of Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the principle of subsidiarity, the right to good administration under Article 41 of the Charter, and the legal effects of the Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, the Court provides authoritative guidance on the procedural and substantive framework governing case allocation within the European Competition Network.
The ruling underscores that the Commission's discretion in initiating proceedings is not unlimited and that it is subject to obligations of transparency, reasoned decision-making, and compliance with the reasonable time requirement. Undertakings, national competition authorities, and practitioners operating within the European Competition Network should take careful note of the principles articulated in this judgment.
This article is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Sources consulted
Published by Synojus International
Back to English publications