Introduction
On 17 September 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (First Chamber) delivered its judgment in Case C-438/24, Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised v Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon and Others. The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Riigikohus, the Supreme Court of Estonia, by decision of 31 May 2024, received at the Court on 19 June 2024.
The judgment addresses a set of fundamental questions concerning the conditions under which a Member State may lawfully require candidates to pay an electoral deposit as a precondition for standing in elections to the European Parliament. It engages directly with the right to stand as a candidate guaranteed by Article 39 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the general principle of proportionality set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter, and the democratic principle reflected in Article 17(1) of the Charter.
This article explains the legal framework and the key issues raised by the judgment, drawing exclusively on the official document text. It is intended to assist readers in understanding the significance of the ruling within the broader context of EU electoral law and fundamental rights protection.
Background and parties
The applicant in the main proceedings is Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised, a political party in Estonia. The intervening parties before the referring court included the Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon (National Electoral Committee), the Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament), the Õiguskantsler (Chancellor of Justice), and the Justiitsminister (Minister of Justice).
The case was heard by the First Chamber of the Court of Justice, composed of F. Biltgen as President of the Chamber, I. Ziemele as Rapporteur, and Judges A. Kumin, S. Gervasoni, and M. Bošnjak. The Advocate General was T. Ćapeta, and the Registrar was C. Strömholm. A hearing took place on 3 July 2025.
Observations were submitted on behalf of the Estonian Government, the Greek Government, the Netherlands Government, and the European Parliament, reflecting the broader interest of multiple Member States and EU institutions in the outcome of the case.
Legal framework: the Charter provisions at issue
The judgment is framed around three provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 39 of the Charter enshrines the right of EU citizens to vote and to stand as candidates at elections to the European Parliament. This right is central to the democratic legitimacy of the Parliament and to the broader concept of EU citizenship.
Article 52(1) of the Charter governs the conditions under which rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter may be limited. Any limitation must be provided for by law, must respect the essence of the right in question, and, subject to the principle of proportionality, may be imposed only if it is necessary and genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 17(1) of the Charter, which enshrines the democratic principle, is also identified in the judgment's subject-matter headings as a relevant provision, underscoring that the regulation of candidacy conditions has implications not only for individual rights but also for the structural integrity of democratic processes within the European Union.
The judgment also engages with the Act concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, which provides the primary legislative framework governing eligibility conditions for European Parliament elections across the Member States.
The core legal questions
The preliminary ruling procedure required the Court to examine whether a national requirement to pay an electoral deposit as a condition of eligibility to stand in European Parliament elections is compatible with EU law, and in particular with the Charter provisions identified above.
A key issue identified in the judgment's subject-matter headings is the objective pursued by such a deposit requirement. The document specifically references the objective of discouraging the presentation of non-serious or frivolous nominations for registration. The Court was therefore called upon to assess whether this objective constitutes a legitimate aim capable of justifying a limitation on the right guaranteed by Article 39 of the Charter.
A further dimension of the case concerns the representativeness of the electorate. This suggests that the judgment considers whether deposit requirements may serve a function related to ensuring that candidates who proceed to the ballot have a meaningful connection to, or support within, the electorate, and whether that consideration can inform the proportionality analysis.
Crucially, the judgment addresses the proportionality of the amount of the deposit having regard to the objectives pursued. This framing indicates that the Court's analysis does not simply ask whether a deposit requirement is permissible in principle, but also whether the specific level at which a deposit is set can be scrutinised under EU law for compliance with the proportionality requirement in Article 52(1) of the Charter.
Significance for EU electoral law
The judgment is significant for several reasons. First, it confirms that the right to stand as a candidate at European Parliament elections, as guaranteed by Article 39 of the Charter, is subject to the general limitations framework in Article 52(1), meaning that national eligibility conditions must satisfy the requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality under EU law.
Second, by engaging with the Act concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage alongside the Charter, the judgment situates national electoral deposit rules within a layered legal framework that combines primary EU law with the specific legislative instrument governing European Parliament elections.
Third, the explicit reference to the proportionality of the amount of the deposit signals that the Court is prepared to scrutinise not merely the existence of a deposit requirement but also its quantitative dimension. This has practical implications for Member States that impose such requirements, as it suggests that the level of a deposit must be calibrated to the objectives it pursues and cannot be set at a level that would effectively deter legitimate candidacies.
Fourth, the involvement of the Greek Government, the Netherlands Government, and the European Parliament as parties submitting observations reflects the cross-border relevance of the ruling. Electoral deposit requirements exist in various forms across Member States, and the principles articulated by the Court in this judgment will be relevant to the assessment of those national rules under EU law.
The preliminary ruling mechanism and the role of the Riigikohus
The case reached the Court of Justice through the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 267 TFEU. This mechanism allows, and in certain circumstances requires, national courts to refer questions of EU law to the Court of Justice for an authoritative interpretation before delivering their own judgment.
The Riigikohus, as the Supreme Court of Estonia, made its reference by decision of 31 May 2024. As a court of last instance, the Riigikohus is in principle obliged under Article 267 TFEU to refer questions of EU law that are necessary for the resolution of the dispute before it, unless the answer is so clear as to leave no reasonable doubt. The decision to refer in this case reflects the genuine uncertainty surrounding the compatibility of the Estonian electoral deposit requirement with the Charter.
The preliminary ruling procedure ensures that EU law is interpreted and applied uniformly across all Member States. The judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-438/24 is therefore binding not only in the context of the Estonian proceedings but also provides authoritative guidance for all national courts and authorities dealing with analogous questions in other Member States.
Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Justice of 17 September 2026 in Case C-438/24, Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised v Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon and Others, addresses a question of considerable importance for the regulation of European Parliament elections across the Member States. By examining the compatibility of electoral deposit requirements with Article 39, Article 52(1), and Article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court engages with the intersection of individual electoral rights, democratic principles, and the proportionality framework that governs limitations on Charter rights.
The judgment makes clear that national rules conditioning candidacy on the payment of a deposit must pursue legitimate objectives — such as discouraging non-serious or frivolous nominations — and that the amount of any such deposit must be proportionate to those objectives. Member States, national courts, and electoral authorities should take careful account of the principles articulated in this ruling when designing, applying, or reviewing electoral eligibility conditions for European Parliament elections.
Readers seeking to understand how this judgment applies to their specific circumstances, or to the rules of a particular Member State, are encouraged to consult qualified legal professionals with expertise in EU electoral law and fundamental rights.
This article is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Sources consulted
Published by Synojus International
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