Introduction
On 8 October 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section) delivered its judgment in the case of Cherkasov and Kuzin v. Ukraine (Applications nos. 72982/17 and 74407/17). The case was brought by two Ukrainian nationals, Mr Oleksandr Volodymyrovych Cherkasov and Mr Sergiy Volodymyrovych Kuzin, both of whom had been registered as internally displaced persons (IDPs) following the armed hostilities in eastern Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea.
At the heart of the case was the suspension of the applicants' retirement pension payments on the basis that, from 1 July 2016 onwards, social benefits payable to IDPs could only be disbursed through accounts held with a designated State bank, the Derzhavnyy Oshchadnyy Bank of Ukraine (Oshchadbank). The applicants argued that this requirement violated their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and that it was discriminatory when read in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.
The judgment addresses two distinct but related questions: first, whether the interference with the applicants' pension entitlements was sufficiently prescribed by law; and second, whether any difference in treatment between IDP pensioners and other pensioners was objectively and reasonably justified. The Court's findings on each of these questions carry significant implications for the legal framework governing social benefit administration in conflict-affected contexts.
Background: displacement, IDP status, and the Oshchadbank requirement
The factual background to the case is rooted in the large-scale displacement of civilians that followed Russia's occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, and the armed hostilities in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, beginning in 2014. Many residents of those areas relocated to government-controlled territories and registered as IDPs, thereby becoming entitled to the same social benefits as other Ukrainian citizens.
According to the judgment, from 1 July 2016 onwards, IDPs were required to hold an account with Oshchadbank and to undergo periodic physical identification at that institution in order to continue receiving their social benefits. This requirement was introduced by Resolution no. 637 of the Cabinet of Ministers of 5 November 2014, as amended in June 2016.
Both applicants had previously lived in Donetsk and had relocated to government-controlled territories following the hostilities. The first applicant, born in 1958 and residing in Stari Bohorodchany in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region, had been receiving his pension through the post office at his new place of residence. The second applicant, born in 1952 and residing in Kyiv, was similarly entitled to a retirement pension. Neither applicant held an account with Oshchadbank at the time the new requirement came into force, and both had their pension payments suspended as a result.
The first applicant's circumstances
The first applicant was registered as a pensioner with the Bohorodchany Department of the Pension Fund in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region. In June 2016, that body informed him that from 1 July 2016 social payments to IDPs would be made exclusively through Oshchadbank. His pension payments were suspended the following month because he had not provided details of an account opened with that institution.
In August 2016, the first applicant requested that his pension payments be resumed and transferred to an account he had opened with a private bank. He was informed that this was not possible, as Resolution no. 637, as amended in June 2016, explicitly provided that payment of social benefits to IDPs could only be made to accounts held with Oshchadbank.
These circumstances illustrate the practical effect of the regulatory requirement on individual pensioners: the suspension was automatic upon non-compliance with the Oshchadbank account condition, regardless of whether the pensioner held an account with another financial institution or had previously been receiving payments through alternative channels.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: the lawfulness of the interference
The Court examined the applicants' complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which protects the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. The judgment records that the Court found the interference with the applicants' pension entitlements was not sufficiently 'prescribed by law', as required by the Convention.
Central to this finding was the Court's assessment that there was a potential conflict between statutory and regulatory provisions at the material time, and that this conflict had not been resolved in a clear and reasoned manner by the domestic courts. The judgment states that the required level of clarity and foreseeability of the legal framework had not been attained.
The principle that any interference with Convention rights must be lawful is a foundational requirement of the Convention system. Where the legal basis for an interference is insufficiently clear or foreseeable, the interference cannot be justified regardless of the legitimacy of the aim pursued or the proportionality of the measure. The Court's finding on this point reflects the importance it attaches to the quality of domestic law as a safeguard against arbitrary action by public authorities.
Article 14 read with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: the discrimination complaint
The applicants also complained that the Oshchadbank requirement was discriminatory, arguing that it treated IDP pensioners less favourably than pensioners without IDP status, who were not required to hold an account with a designated State bank in order to receive their pension payments.
On this point, the Court reached a different conclusion. The judgment records that the Court found the difference in treatment between the applicants and pensioners without IDP status was proportionate and did not exceed the wide margin of appreciation afforded to states in matters of social and economic policy. The Court found that the distinction pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring the secure and effective administration of pension payments to IDPs during an exceptional period of armed conflict.
The Court further found that the requirement did not impose an individual and excessive burden on the applicants, and that there was an objective and reasonable justification for the difference in treatment. This aspect of the judgment reflects the Court's recognition that states may adopt specific administrative arrangements for the delivery of social benefits to particularly vulnerable or difficult-to-reach populations, provided that such arrangements are grounded in legitimate aims and are not disproportionate in their effects.
Significance of the judgment for the legal framework governing IDP social benefits
The judgment in Cherkasov and Kuzin v. Ukraine is notable for the distinction it draws between the lawfulness of an interference and the justification for a difference in treatment. While the Court found that the suspension of pension payments was not sufficiently prescribed by law — owing to the lack of clarity and foreseeability in the domestic legal framework — it simultaneously found that the underlying policy of channelling IDP social benefit payments through a designated State bank was not in itself discriminatory.
This distinction has practical implications for the design and implementation of social benefit schemes in conflict-affected contexts. It underscores that even where a state pursues a legitimate administrative aim, the legal basis for any resulting interference with individual rights must meet the Convention's standards of clarity and foreseeability. Domestic courts are expected to resolve conflicts between statutory and regulatory provisions in a clear and reasoned manner.
The judgment also engages with the broader context of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and the displacement of large numbers of civilians. The Court's acceptance that the Oshchadbank requirement pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring secure and effective administration of pension payments during an exceptional period of armed conflict reflects the latitude it affords to states when managing complex logistical and security challenges in conflict settings, provided that the measures adopted remain within the bounds of the Convention.
Admissibility and procedural matters
The judgment notes that the Court declared the Article 6 § 1 complaint raised in application no. 74407/17 — concerning an alleged lack of access to a higher court — inadmissible. Only the complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, were communicated to the Ukrainian Government and proceeded to a merits examination.
The applications were lodged with the Court on 25 September and 11 October 2017, respectively. The Chamber deliberated in private on 2 December 2025 and 8 September 2026, with the judgment adopted on the latter date. The judgment was delivered by a Chamber of the Fifth Section composed of seven judges, with Kateřina Šimáčková serving as President.
As noted in the judgment, it will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention and may be subject to editorial revision. The case reference is ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:1008JUD007298217, and the judgment is accessible via the HUDOC database at the url recorded in the case metadata.
Conclusion
The judgment in Cherkasov and Kuzin v. Ukraine addresses a set of issues that arise at the intersection of social security law, administrative regulation, and the protection of the rights of internally displaced persons under the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court's finding that the suspension of pension payments was not sufficiently prescribed by law — due to an unresolved conflict between statutory and regulatory provisions and the absence of clear and reasoned domestic court decisions — serves as a reminder of the importance of legal certainty as a foundational requirement of the Convention system.
At the same time, the Court's rejection of the discrimination complaint, on the basis that the Oshchadbank requirement pursued a legitimate aim and did not impose an individual and excessive burden on the applicants, illustrates the wide margin of appreciation that states retain in designing administrative systems for the delivery of social benefits during periods of armed conflict and mass displacement.
Taken together, the two findings in this judgment offer important guidance on the standards that domestic legal frameworks and judicial reasoning must meet when states introduce specific requirements for the administration of social benefits to IDPs. Institutions and practitioners working in this field should consult the full text of the judgment, available through the HUDOC database, for a complete understanding of the Court's reasoning.
This article is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Sources consulted
- CASE OF CHERKASOV AND KUZIN v. UKRAINE - European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe
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