Introduction
On 24 September 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Third Chamber) delivered its judgment in Case C-190/25, LS v GT. The case reached the Court by way of a request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, a German appellate court, and it sits at the intersection of EU private international law, canon law, and the constitutional arrangements that exist between the Holy See and certain Member States of the European Union.
The judgment addresses a set of questions that arise with practical frequency wherever Catholic canonical marriage is recognised as producing civil effects under a concordat or bilateral treaty: what happens when one spouse pursues a civil divorce before the courts of one Member State while the other seeks, before the courts of a different Member State, the recognition of a decision by an ecclesiastical court declaring the same marriage null and void? The CJEU was asked to clarify how Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 — commonly known as Brussels IIa — governs that situation, and in particular how its lis pendens and related provisions interact with the treaty obligations that a Member State may owe to the Holy See.
Legal framework: Brussels IIa and its key provisions
Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 establishes uniform rules on jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility across the Member States of the European Union. Its overarching aim is to prevent parallel proceedings and irreconcilable judgments by allocating jurisdiction clearly and by providing a streamlined mechanism for the mutual recognition of decisions.
Article 19 of the Regulation is central to the judgment. It sets out the lis pendens rule for matrimonial matters, providing that where proceedings relating to divorce, legal separation, or the annulment of a marriage between the same parties are brought before courts of different Member States, the court second seised must of its own motion stay its proceedings until the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, and must then, once that jurisdiction is established, decline jurisdiction in favour of that court. The concept of an 'application for annulment of marriage' within the meaning of Article 19 was one of the interpretive questions placed before the Court.
Article 63 of the Regulation contains a specific provision concerning treaties concluded between the Holy See and a Member State. It acknowledges that such treaties may affect the application of the Regulation, thereby recognising the particular constitutional and legal status of concordats and similar instruments that govern the civil recognition of canonical marriages and ecclesiastical decisions in certain Member States.
Facts and the questions referred
The case concerns a marriage solemnised in accordance with canon law. Following the breakdown of the marriage, proceedings were initiated in two different Member States. Before a civil court of one Member State, an application for divorce was brought. Before a civil court of another Member State — the Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart being involved in the appellate chain — an application was made for the recognition of the civil effects of a decision by an ecclesiastical court declaring that same marriage null and void.
The Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart referred questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, seeking guidance on two principal matters. First, whether an application for the recognition of the civil effects of an ecclesiastical nullity decision falls within the concept of an 'application for annulment of marriage' as that term is used in Article 19 of Regulation No 2201/2003, such that the lis pendens rule would be triggered as between the divorce proceedings and the recognition proceedings. Second, how Article 63 of the Regulation, which addresses treaties with the Holy See, bears upon the analysis.
These questions are not merely technical. Their answer determines whether the two sets of proceedings can continue in parallel, whether one court must stay or decline jurisdiction, and ultimately which legal outcome — civil divorce or civil recognition of canonical nullity — takes precedence in the legal orders of the Member States concerned.
The Court's analysis of the concept of 'annulment of marriage' under Article 19
The CJEU was called upon to interpret the scope of the phrase 'application for annulment of marriage' within Article 19 of Regulation No 2201/2003. This interpretive exercise is significant because the Regulation itself does not define 'annulment' in a manner that explicitly addresses the situation where the nullity has been declared not by a civil court but by an ecclesiastical tribunal, and where what is sought before the civil court is not a fresh declaration of nullity but rather the recognition of the civil effects of the ecclesiastical decision.
The judgment, delivered by the Third Chamber, engages with the question of whether such a recognition application is sufficiently equivalent in its object and effect to a direct application for annulment to engage the lis pendens mechanism. The referral from the Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart reflects genuine uncertainty in national practice about how to classify these proceedings under the autonomous concepts of EU law.
The Court's reasoning in this area is guided by the need to give the Regulation's provisions an autonomous and uniform interpretation across all Member States, independent of the classifications used in any particular national legal system. The practical stakes are high: if the recognition application is treated as equivalent to an annulment application for the purposes of Article 19, the lis pendens rule is engaged and one of the two courts must yield; if it is not so treated, both sets of proceedings may continue simultaneously, with the risk of irreconcilable outcomes.
The role of Article 63 and treaties with the Holy See
Article 63 of Regulation No 2201/2003 occupies a distinctive place in the Regulation's architecture. It expressly acknowledges that treaties concluded between the Holy See and a Member State may have consequences for the application of the Regulation. This provision reflects the historical and constitutional reality that several Member States — including Italy, Spain, and Portugal, among others — have entered into concordats or similar agreements with the Holy See under which canonical marriages are recognised as producing civil effects and under which decisions of ecclesiastical tribunals on the nullity of marriage may be given civil recognition through a domestic procedure.
The judgment in Case C-190/25 required the Court to consider how Article 63 interacts with the lis pendens rule in Article 19. The question is whether the treaty obligations of a Member State vis-à-vis the Holy See can modify or displace the ordinary operation of the Regulation's jurisdiction and lis pendens rules, or whether the Regulation's framework takes precedence in a manner that constrains how Member States may give effect to their concordat obligations.
This is a constitutionally sensitive area, because concordats are instruments of public international law binding on the Member States that have concluded them, and the Holy See is a subject of international law distinct from any EU Member State. The Court's engagement with Article 63 in this judgment therefore has implications not only for the parties to the case but for the broader relationship between EU private international law and the treaty commitments of Member States in the field of marriage law.
Significance for national courts and practitioners
The preliminary ruling mechanism under which this case arose is designed precisely to ensure that national courts across the EU apply EU law consistently. The Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart's decision to refer these questions reflects the genuine interpretive difficulty that arises when the categories of EU private international law — developed primarily with civil and secular legal systems in mind — are applied to proceedings that originate in or are connected to the canonical legal order.
For national courts in Member States that have concluded treaties with the Holy See, the judgment provides authoritative guidance on how to classify recognition applications and on whether and when the lis pendens rule in Article 19 requires them to stay or decline jurisdiction. This is practically important because such proceedings are not uncommon in those Member States, and inconsistent national approaches risk producing exactly the kind of irreconcilable judgments that the Regulation is designed to prevent.
The case also illustrates the broader challenge of applying a regulation that was drafted with civil matrimonial proceedings in mind to situations involving ecclesiastical tribunals, whose decisions have no direct place in the Regulation's own framework but which may acquire civil legal effects through the domestic law of a Member State acting pursuant to its treaty obligations.
Conclusion
Case C-190/25, LS v GT, decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union on 24 September 2026, addresses a genuinely complex intersection of EU private international law, canon law, and public international law. By interpreting the concept of 'application for annulment of marriage' in Article 19 of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 and by examining the role of Article 63 in relation to treaties concluded between the Holy See and Member States, the Third Chamber has provided guidance that is relevant to national courts, practitioners, and parties involved in matrimonial proceedings that span the civil and canonical legal orders.
The judgment underscores that the autonomous concepts of EU law must be interpreted in a manner that serves the Regulation's objectives of legal certainty, the prevention of parallel proceedings, and the avoidance of irreconcilable judgments — even in legally complex situations involving ecclesiastical tribunals and concordat obligations. National courts in Member States with such treaty arrangements will need to take careful account of this ruling when proceedings of the kind described in the referral come before them.
This article is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Sources consulted
Published by Synojus International
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