Introduction
On 16 July 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Third Chamber) delivered its judgment in case C-26/25, PQ v Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság and Alkotmányvédelmi Hivatal. The case arose as a reference for a preliminary ruling and concerns a set of legally significant questions at the intersection of EU citizenship law, the EU framework governing the return of illegally staying third-country nationals, and the procedural rights of individuals whose cases involve classified national security information.
The judgment engages with Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which establishes citizenship of the European Union, as well as Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in member states for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. The case also raises fundamental questions about the primacy of EU law in circumstances where national authorities rely on statements from specialist security bodies — in this instance the Alkotmányvédelmi Hivatal, Hungary's constitutional protection office — to justify measures affecting an individual's residence status.
This article examines the key legal dimensions of the judgment as they appear in the official case record, with a view to helping readers understand the broader institutional and legal context in which the Court of Justice operates when balancing national security interests against individual procedural rights under EU law.
Background and parties to the proceedings
The applicant in the main proceedings, referred to as PQ, is a third-country national who is a family member of a Union citizen. Crucially, the judgment record indicates that the Union citizen in question has never exercised his or her right of freedom of movement. This detail is legally significant because it engages the question of whether, and to what extent, EU law — and in particular the rights derived from Article 20 TFEU — applies to the situation of a third-country national whose Union citizen family member has remained entirely within a single member state.
The respondents are the Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság, the regional directorate of Hungary's national immigration authority responsible for the Dél-alföld region, and the Alkotmányvédelmi Hivatal, Hungary's specialist constitutional protection authority. The involvement of the latter body is central to the case, as it appears to have issued a statement characterising PQ as a threat to national security — a statement that formed part of the basis for the immigration authority's decision.
The reference for a preliminary ruling was submitted to the Court of Justice as case C-26/25, indicating that the referring national court sought guidance on the interpretation of EU law before resolving the dispute at the domestic level. The preliminary ruling procedure, provided for under Article 267 TFEU, allows national courts to obtain authoritative interpretations of EU law from the Court of Justice, ensuring uniform application across member states.
The legal framework: Article 20 TFEU and Directive 2008/115/EC
Article 20 TFEU confers citizenship of the European Union on every person holding the nationality of a member state and establishes that Union citizens enjoy the rights and are subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties. The Court of Justice has developed a body of case law recognising that, in certain circumstances, third-country nationals who are family members of Union citizens may derive rights under Article 20 TFEU even where the Union citizen has not exercised free movement rights. The judgment in C-26/25 engages directly with this line of reasoning in the context of a national security-based return decision.
Directive 2008/115/EC establishes common standards and procedures applicable in member states for returning third-country nationals who are staying illegally on the territory of the European Union. The directive sets out the conditions under which return decisions may be issued, the procedural safeguards that must accompany such decisions, and the circumstances in which member states may derogate from ordinary procedures — including on grounds of national security. The interplay between these derogation provisions and the fundamental procedural rights of affected individuals is a recurring source of legal tension that the Court of Justice is called upon to resolve.
The judgment also addresses the principle of the primacy of EU law, which requires national courts and authorities to disapply national rules that are incompatible with EU law. Where a national procedural framework governing access to classified information in immigration proceedings is found to be inconsistent with the requirements of EU law — including the right to an effective remedy and the right to be heard — the primacy principle obliges national courts to set aside the conflicting national rules.
National security statements and procedural rights
A central issue in the case concerns the role played by the statement of the Alkotmányvédelmi Hivatal, the specialist national authority that characterised PQ as a threat to national security. The judgment record indicates that this statement formed a material part of the basis for the immigration authority's decision, raising questions about the extent to which such statements must be reasoned, disclosed, and subject to judicial scrutiny.
The tension between national security confidentiality and individual procedural rights is well established in EU law. On one hand, member states retain competence over matters of national security, and EU law recognises that certain information may legitimately be withheld from an applicant where disclosure would compromise security interests. On the other hand, the right to an effective remedy, as guaranteed by EU law, requires that individuals be able to challenge decisions affecting their legal status in a meaningful way, which presupposes at least some degree of access to the reasoning underlying those decisions.
The judgment engages with the question of what procedural guarantees must be in place when classified information is used as the basis for a return decision. This includes consideration of whether the individual concerned, or their legal representative, must be given access to the file or to a summary of the classified material sufficient to enable an effective challenge, and what role the national court must play in reviewing the classified information itself. The statement of reasons requirement — that is, the obligation on authorities to explain the basis for their decisions — is also addressed in this context.
The primacy of EU law and its implications for national proceedings
The judgment addresses the primacy of EU law as a distinct legal issue, reflecting the fact that the referring court was confronted with national procedural rules that may have limited its ability to scrutinise the classified information relied upon by the immigration and security authorities. The primacy principle, as a foundational element of the EU legal order, requires that where national law prevents a court from fulfilling its obligations under EU law — including the obligation to ensure effective judicial protection — the national court must set aside the conflicting national provision.
In the context of proceedings involving classified national security information, this has practical consequences for the way in which national courts must conduct their review. The judgment, as reflected in the case record, indicates that the Court of Justice was asked to clarify the extent to which EU law requires national courts to have access to classified material, and whether a national framework that restricts such access is compatible with the requirements of Directive 2008/115/EC and the broader principles of EU law.
The primacy issue also intersects with the question of the legal effect of the specialist authority's statement. If that statement is treated as binding on the immigration authority — in the sense that the authority has no discretion to depart from it — this raises further questions about the compatibility of such an arrangement with EU law, which generally requires that decisions affecting individual rights be subject to full and independent judicial review.
The situation of third-country nationals as family members of static Union citizens
One of the distinctive features of the case is that the Union citizen family member of PQ has never exercised his or her right of freedom of movement. This places the case in a specific and legally contested category: the so-called 'purely internal' situation, where all elements of the case are confined to a single member state. The Court of Justice has, in its prior jurisprudence, recognised that Article 20 TFEU may nonetheless apply in such situations where the practical effect of a national measure would be to deprive the Union citizen of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by Union citizenship.
The judgment in C-26/25 thus required the Court to consider whether the return of PQ — a third-country national family member — would have such an effect on the Union citizen concerned. This analysis is inherently fact-sensitive and depends on the nature of the dependency relationship between the Union citizen and the third-country national, as well as the consequences that removal would have for the Union citizen's ability to remain in and enjoy the rights associated with EU citizenship.
The inclusion of this issue in a case that also involves national security considerations adds a further layer of complexity. Even where a third-country national would ordinarily derive rights under Article 20 TFEU as a family member of a Union citizen, those rights are not absolute and may be subject to limitations on grounds of public policy or national security, provided that the limitations comply with the requirements of EU law, including proportionality and effective judicial protection.
Significance of the judgment for EU immigration and asylum law
The judgment in C-26/25 is significant for several reasons. First, it contributes to the ongoing development of the Court of Justice's jurisprudence on the rights of third-country nationals who are family members of Union citizens in purely internal situations, clarifying the conditions under which Article 20 TFEU may be engaged even in the absence of cross-border movement.
Second, the judgment addresses a recurring and practically important question in EU immigration law: how must member states structure their national procedures when classified national security information is used as the basis for a return decision, in order to comply with the procedural guarantees required by Directive 2008/115/EC and the general principles of EU law? The answer provided by the Court has implications not only for Hungary but for all member states that operate similar procedural frameworks.
Third, the emphasis on the primacy of EU law reinforces the obligation on national courts to ensure that their procedural rules do not, in practice, deprive individuals of the effective judicial protection to which they are entitled under EU law. This is particularly relevant in the context of national security proceedings, where the temptation to defer entirely to the assessments of specialist authorities may be strong, but where EU law nonetheless requires independent judicial scrutiny.
Finally, the case illustrates the broader institutional role of the preliminary ruling procedure in ensuring the uniform interpretation and application of EU law across member states, particularly in sensitive areas such as immigration, national security, and the rights of Union citizens and their family members.
Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in case C-26/25, PQ v Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság and Alkotmányvédelmi Hivatal, delivered on 16 July 2026, addresses a complex intersection of EU citizenship law, the return directive, national security procedures, and the primacy of EU law. The case highlights the ongoing challenges that arise when member states seek to rely on classified national security assessments in immigration proceedings, and the obligations that EU law imposes on national courts and authorities in such circumstances.
The involvement of a third-country national who is a family member of a Union citizen who has never exercised free movement rights adds a further dimension to the case, engaging the Court's jurisprudence on the scope of Article 20 TFEU in purely internal situations. The judgment serves as a reminder that even in areas closely connected to national security — a domain in which member states retain significant competence — the requirements of EU law, including effective judicial protection and the primacy principle, continue to apply and must be respected by national courts and authorities.
Readers seeking to understand the full legal reasoning and operative provisions of the judgment are encouraged to consult the official text of the decision, available through the EUR-Lex database of the European Union at the reference CELEX:62025CJ0026. This article is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Legal notice
This article is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Sources consulted
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